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COST OF PERFORMANCE OR
DIFFERENCE IN VALUE?
Richard S. Wirtzt
Hog pens installed on a pork farm are too small to accommodate
the promised rate of production! Concrete slabs installed as the floor
in a "big box" retail establishment are not properly cured.2 The
owners of a new home plead and prove multiple defects in
construction, including a sagging roof line, crooked brickwork,
crooked columns, windows and shutters not right, and doors out of
plumb.3 The New Haven Parking Authority, proprietor of a newly
built parking garage, discovers water pooling on the decks in the
garage and cracks in the concrete.4 A house is misplaced on a lot.5
All of these situations present the same issue, viz., the proper
measure of damages when a contractor does defective work.
Everyone accepts that the object in awarding damages for breach of
contract is to put the injured party in as good a position as the one she
would have been in if the contract had been fully performed. The
problem in these cases is that there are two ways to measure the
injured party's expectancy. One, called "cost of performance," results
in an award of the reasonable cost of correcting the defects.6 The
other, "difference in value," is the difference between the value of the
premises if the contract had been fully performed and its value with
the defects.
tElvin E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Tennessee.
Thanks to Dwight Aarons, Joseph Cook and Robert Lloyd for their helpfuil comments on an
earlier draft; Nicholas Barca, Jonathan Born, Anica Conner and Douglas Elkins for able
assistance in research; and to Gregory Stein for pointing me to an important case.
1Clark's Pork Farms v. Sand Livestock Sys., Inc., 563 N.E.2d 1292, 1296 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990).
2 Crest Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 115 P.2d 349, 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
3DiMa Homes, Inc. v. Stuart, 873 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
4Kevin Roche-John Dinkeloo & Assocs. v. City of New Haven, 535 A.2d 1287, 1288
(Conn. 1988).
5Levesque v. D & M Builders, Inc., 365 A.2d 1216, 1217-18 (Conn. 1976).
6 It is sometimes useful to distinguish between rectifying bad work and completing an
incomplete performance. In this article I use the phrase "correcting the defects" to apply to both
things.
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This Article investigates three different rules applied to determine
which measure of damages is the right one: the rule of the
Peevy ho use v. Garland Coal and Mining Company 7 case, and the
rules set forth in the first and second Restatements of Contracts. In the
course of this discussion, this Article argues that all three of the rules
ignore an issue which ought to be at the center of the inquiry, i.e., the
intentions of the injured party with regard to correction of the defects.
1. THE PEE VYHO USE CASE
In the 1950Os the Garland Coal Company was buying up mineral
leases in Oklahoma.8 They approached a farming couple named
Peevyhouse with an offer for a standard lease. The Peevyhouses
consented to lease a portion of their farm to Garland Coal, but, unlike
their neighbors, insisted on a commitment from the coal company to
reclaim the land according to detailed standards which were made a
part of the contract.9 This was the Peevyhouses' home farm.'0
Garland Coal took all the coal it wanted from the Peevyhouse
property and then refused to do any reclamation. A dispute arose
which eventually went to trial."1 The jury awarded the plaintiffs
$5,000. On appeal, the sole issue was the proper measure of the
farmers' damages. The Peevyhouses contended that the proper
measure was the amount it would cost them to have the reclamation
work done by someone else. Garland Coal contended that the proper
measure was the difference in the value of the property with and
without the reclamation. 12 The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded
that the evidence showed that under the first approach the farmers
would recover $29,000, but under the second they would recover only
$300. 13 After due consideration, the court rejected the Peevyhouses'
arguments, and awarded them $300. 14
In the breasts of many readers, this decision has aroused the sense
of injustice. The court justified it on the basis of what it termed
"'6relative economic benefit.""
382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of
Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1341, 1345 (1995). The facts as stated here are drawn
from the opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining
Co., 382 P.2d 109, and Judith L. Maute's excellent article, supra.
9Peevyha use, 382 P.2d at Il11.
0 Maute, supra note 8, at 1345, 1356-57.
"Id Jat 1345.
12 Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at I111.
"~ Id. at 112, 114.
14 Id. at 114.
15 Id. at 113 (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES, §
168 (1935); Jacobs & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 192 1)).
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In its opinion the court quoted approvingly language from the
opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent:16 "'.The owner is entitled to the money which
will permit him to complete, unless the cost of completion is grossly
and unfairly out of proportion to the good to be attained. When that is
true, the measure is the difference in value."' 17 Though the
Peevyhouse court framed its holding narrowly in terms of coal mining
leases, 18 the case can fairly be read for the broader proposition that
in a breach of contract case involving work to be done on specified
property, when the cost of rectifying the breach is grossly
disproportionate to the difference in value of the property with and
without the promised performance, the injured part may recover only
the difference in value.' 9 This Article will refer to this as the rule of
the Peevyhouse case, or the Peevyhouse rule.
The idea behind the Peevyhouse rule is that it is irrational to spend
X to get Y, if Y is much less than X. The court does not ask whether,
if the plaintiff were awarded the amount required to complete the
contract, he would in fact spend the money that way. The court stands
back and compares two figures. One, the cost of performance, is the
benchmark-the amount to which the plaintiff is prima facie entitled.
The second figure, the difference in value, must be compared to the
benchmark figure. If the figures match, the plaintiff is entitled to the
cost of performance. To the extent that the difference in value drops
below the cost of performance, the differential represents a potential
problem. If the differential is small, the cost of performance is not
grossly disproportionate to the difference in value, and the court
awards the cost of performance anyway. Once the excess of the cost
of performance over difference in value reaches the point of gross
disproportionality, however, the plaintiffs recovery must be capped
at the level of the smaller figure.2
A. The Virtue of the Rule
The principal argument in favor of the limitation the Peevyho use
rule places on the recovery of the injured party is that, in some
instances, the rule prevents unjust enrichment.
Suppose that Moors, having drawn up specifications for a house,
contracts with Wiggin to build the house for $200,000. Through
'6 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 192 1).
17 Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 113 (quoting Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 891).
j" Id at 114.
19 See, e.g., Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847, 852 (Okla. 1994) (noting that the
majority view follows Peevyho use).
20 Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 112-14.
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simple carelessness, Wiggin gets many of the interior dimensions
wrong, while leaving the total square footage of the house as
specified. It will cost $20,000 to correct the mistakes. The proof
shows that the buyers who constitute the hypothetical market for the
house would be willing to pay just as much for the house Wiggin built
as they would for the house he promised to build.
Under the Peevyhouse rule, Moors recovers nothing for Wiggin's
breach. The cost of rectifying the breach, $20,000, is grossly
disproportionate to the difference in value, which is zero.
If we assume that Moors intends to sell the house, a $20,000
payment from Wiggin would be a windfall to her. Her profit on the
sale of the house would be the same as it would have been if Wiggin
had built the house according to the plans. The $20,000 would be
pure gravy. However, applying the Peevy house rule, she gets
nothing-if she were awarded anything in damages, she would be
unjustly enriched to the extent of the award.
Note that, on these facts, no rational plaintiff would invest a dollar
of the $20,000 in remodeling the house. A rational plaintiff would use
the money for other purposes, such as a year in Provence. Moors
would get the functional equivalent of what she contracted for, and
Wiggin would wind up paying for her vacation. That can't be right.
In contrast, if this house as built would sell for less than the
promised house, but the injured party still intends to sell the property,
the rule also prevents a windfall. Suppose that in the case of the
mis-configured house, Wiggin's deviations from the plans render the
property worth $500 less on the market than it would have been had
he built the house strictly according to the plans. On this assumption,
should Moors now recover the cost of rectifying the contractor's
mistakes? Applying the Pee yyhouse rule, the answer is, once again,
no: the cost of performance-the cost of rectifying the breach
($20,000)--is grossly disproportionate to the diminution in value
($500). And this is right: if she received $20,000, Moors would reap a
$19,500 windfall-a result the law should strive to avoid.
Suppose now that the difference in value is $500 as before, but the
homeowner intends to keep the house rather than sell it. Now, in
order to determine whether she would be unjustly enriched by a
damage award in the amount of $20,000, we would have to know
something more. Since we are exploring here the positive side of the
Peevy house rule, assume that if she were awarded the cost of
performance, she would spend no part of it to reconfigure the house.
She would say to herself, in substance: I would rather have had the
house built according to the plans, but if we are talking about $20,000
64 [V l  59:1
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of my money, I certainly wouldn't spend it to fix the problems-what
a waste of $20,000!-and I have no intention of spending Wiggin's
$20,000 that way, either. Once again, if she gets the cost of
performance, she gets a windfall. Her proper recovery, and her
recovery under the rule, is $500.
Finally, suppose that the homeowner attaches significant value to
the deviations from the plans, and if she gets the money required to
purchase substitute performance, which concededly exceeds the
difference in market value by a substantial margin, she will spend it to
put the house right. On these facts, the rule unjustly enriches, not the
injured party, but the party in breach.
B. The Problem With the Rule
The Peevyhouse rule has a major shortcoming. In some of its
applications it frustrates the primary purpose of the law of contract
damages in that it fails to put the injured party in as good a position as
the one he would have been in had the contract been frilly
performed. In those instances it unjustly enriches the party in breach.
It is axiomatic that
[t]he basic principle for the measure of damages [for breach
of contract] is that of compensation based on the injured
party's expectation. One is entitled to recover an amount that
will put one in as good a position as one would have been in
had the contract been performed.2
Returning to the example of the house not built according to the
plans, now add one fact: if the homeowner receives anything in
damages, she will use it to rebuild the house so it conforms as closely
as possible to the original plans. Embellishing a little, suppose that in
her previous house there was constant wearisome bickering among
Moors' four kids about the relative size of their bedrooms, and her
specifications for the new house were drawn up with the end in view
of reducing the grounds for such squabbling to a minimum. Suppose
the house as built reopens all the old issues in the family, which
Moors had sought to avoid. Suppose that the difference in value of the
house with and without rectification of the breach is nil. And suppose
further that the trier of fact finds that if Moors gets $20,000, the cost
of substitute performance to get the job done in compliance with the
contract, she will spend it for that purpose.
2! E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, coNTRACTs § 12.8, at 757-58 (4th ed. 2004).
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On these facts, under the Peevyhouse rule, Moors is entitled to
nothing. This result emphatically will not put her in as good a position
as she would be in if the contract had been fully performed. If the
contract had been fully performed, she would have had a satisfactory
house. Under the rule of the Peevy ho use case, she gets an
unsatisfactory house and no damages.
In a case of this kind-assuming that the injured party will spend
the amount required to put matters right on doing just that-if she is
awarded that sum, there is no windfall. She is not unjustly enriched;
she gets only what she paid for.
Varying the facts from above: if the poor workmanship reduces the
market value of the house to a figure $500 below the market value of
a house built according to the plans-and operating on the continuing
assumption that if she gets the cost of rectifying the breach she will
spend it to do just that-again an award of the difference in value
does not give Moors the benefit of the bargain. Only an award of
$20,000 will do that. Any lower award lets the contractor off the hook
for his sloppy workmanship. To the extent that the contractor is held
harmless with respect to any part of the cost of setting matters right, it
is the contractor who is unjustly enriched.
Consider now the Peevyhouse case. In that case, on the question of
whether the Peevyhouses would spend the $29,000 it would cost to
reclaim their farm as specifically provided in the lease, there was no
finding either way. 2 On the facts, it seems reasonable to suppose that
they would. This was, after all, their home farm. There is no
indication anywhere that they planned to sell it. During contract
negotiations, they specifically insisted on the reclamation provision.2
(A fact not given in the opinion is that to get the reclamation
provision, they gave up the lump sum Garland Coal normally paid
landowners up front, not as an advance on royalties but as an
additional inducement .2 4) What arouses the sense of injustice is that,
on the reasonable assumption that the Peevyhouses intended to
continue to live on the land, and would have spent an award of
$29,000 to reclaim it as provided in the contract,25 the paltry sum of
22 See Peevyho use, 382 P.2d at 112 (discussing the "basically unreasonable and
unrealistic" outcome that would occur if the court found for the Peevyhouses).
23 Maute, supra note 8, at 1358-63.
24 Id at 1347, 1363.
25 The official record, of course, contains no finding on this, since the question was never
submitted to the jury. In interviews concluded long after the trial and appeal were concluded, the
Peevyhuuses' lawyer recalled that the Peevyhouses intended to do the remedial work
themselves, using any money left over to pay medical bills. The Peevyhouses specifically
denied this. Maute, supra note 8, at 1373. In exchange for the reclamation provisions, the
Peevyhouses waived the stipend Garland Coal normally paid in lieu of reclamation. Id at 1363.
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$300 clearly did not give them the benefit of the bargain. It did not
put the injured parties in as good a position as the one they would
have been in if Garland Coal had done the promised work. This time
it is the party in breach who got the windfall. The rule enabled
Garland Coal to buy itself out, at a cost of $300, of the duty to spend
$29,000 to fulfill its obligations under the contract.
The Peevyhouse opinion creates a picture of the Peevyhouses
spending a lot of money uselessly, filling in holes that no one but
them would care about.26 It's silly, isn't it?-No. As soon as they
bargain for it, it ceases to be silly. That's the way contract law
works.2
Drawing reasonable inferences from the facts, the Peevyhouse case
was wrongly decided. All the good the Peevyhouse rule does can be
accomplished, and all the harm it does can be avoided, by asking one
simple question: what will the plaintiffs do with an award of the cost
of performance if they get it?
Suppose the Peevyhouse jury had been instructed that it should
award the Peevyhouses the amount required to do the reclamation
Garland Coal had promised if it found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiffs would utilize an award in that amount to
do the reclamation (to achieve the bargained-for result).2 Suppose
further that the jury so found, and rendered a verdict of $29,000 for
the farmers accordingly, and the judge entered judgment against
Garland Coal for $29,000 plus costs. And suppose the jury was
wrong. Having collected their $29,000, the Peevyhouses spent it on
expensive visits to their extended family, a lot of advanced farm
equipment, etc.--everything but reclamation.
Similar things happen all the time. Clearly some people who
receive reimbursement from insurance companies for damage to their
cars spend it otherwise than on repairs. It may be that we should not
care what the Peevyhouses do with their large damage award any
In light of what they gave up to get the reclamation provisions, their version seems more
plausible.
26 See Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 112 ("It is highly unlikely that the ordinary property owner
would agree to pay $29,000 (or its equivalent) for the construction of 'improvements' upon his
property that would increase its value only about ($300) three hundred dollars. The result is that
we are called upon to apply principles of law theoretically based upon reason and reality to a
situation which is basically unreasonable and unrealistic.").
27 As was said long ago in Chamberlain v. Parker: "A man may do what he will with his
own . .. and if he chooses to erect a monument to his caprice or folly on his premises, and
employs and pays another to do it, it does not lie with a defendant who has been so employed
and paid for building it, to say that his own performance would not be beneficial to the
plaintiff." 45 N.Y. 569, 572 (1871) (footnote omitted).
28 This is the jury instruction, and subsequent result, I advocate in this Article.
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more than we care what car owners do with their insurance proceeds.
But in the contract damages context the unjustifiably large award
leads to an undesirable result. The Peevyhouses, who based their case
for $29,000 on the cost of restoring their property to something like
its original condition, turn out not to have cared for
reclamation at all. It seems fair to say that they have been unjustly
enriched-just as Moors would be in the case of the wrongly
constructed house if she happily accepted the house as built, knowing
that the mistakes would not affect its resale value when the time
came, and spent the $20,000 she was awarded on college costs and
orthodontia.
There is a way to prevent such a thing from happening in these
cases: Garland Coal could be required to pay the $29,000 into escrow,
with the Peevyhouses given leave to draw it down upon presentation
of reclamation receipts.2
Query whether any court would conclude that this procedure was
worth the bother and expense. If this procedure is not instituted, then,
depending on which rule is adopted, there is a risk of a windfall to the
defendant if the plaintiffs intentions are not taken into account, and
the risk of a windfall to the plaintiff if they are. Perhaps the way it
should play out is this: if someone is to get a windfall, it should be the
injured party, not the party in breach. Between the lines in the
Peevyho use case is the suspicion that the Garland Coal Company
agreed to do reclamation it never had any intention of performing.
Whether or not that was the case, better the loss should fall on them
than on the Peevyhouses, who, after all, did everything right.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's opinion in the Peevyhouse case
has been cited respectfully in subsequent opinions. 0 Interestingly, the
decision appears to have been legislatively overruled .3 1 The chief
29 Thanks to my colleague, Joseph Cook, for this suggestion.
30) See. e.g., Am. Standard, Inc. v. Schectnian, 439 N.Y.S.2d 529, 533 (App. Div. 1981);
Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847, 849-51 (Okla. 1994); P.G. Lake, Inc. v. Sheffield,
438 S.W.2d 952, 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Ruddach v. Don Johnston Ford, Inc., 621 P.2d
742, 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980),judgment rev'd, 644 P.2d 671 (Wash. 1982).
3 ' The Oklahoma Mining Lands Reclamation Act, Section 722, provides in part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this state to provide for the reclamation
and conservation of land subjected to surface disturbance by mining and thereby to
preserve natural resources, to encourage the productive use of such lands after
mining, to aid in the protection of wildlife and aquatic resources, to encourage the
planting of trees, grasses and other vegetation, to establish recreational, home and
industrial sites, to protect and perpetuate the taxable value of property, to aid in the
prevention of erosion, landslides, floods and the pollution of waters and air, to
protect the natural beauty and aesthetic values in the affected areas of this state, and
to protect and promote the health, safety and general welfare of the people of this
state.
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significance of the Peevyhouse rule today-aside from its utility in
tormenting Contracts students-is that it points out the pitfalls in
zeroing in arbitrarily on a diminution in value as "'the good to be
attained"' 32 in a case involving operations to be conducted on real
property. Unfortunately, the rule of the first Restatement of Contracts
is not an improvement.
II. THE RULE OF ECONOMIC WASTE
The rule conventionally applied now to determine the measure of
damages in a case involving breach of a construction contract is
framed not in terms of relative economic benefit, but in terms of
"economic waste."
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 722 (West 1996). Section 725 sets forth detailed reclamation
requirements for mineral lessees. Id. § 725.
In Rock Island Improvement Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 698 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir.
1983), the Tenth Circuit declined to apply the rule of the Peevyhouse case. The court said:
We are convinced that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would no longer apply the rule
it established in Peevyhouse in 1963 if it had the instant dispute before it.
Peevyhouse was a 5-4 decision with a strong dissent. More importantly, the public
policy of the state has changed, as expressed in its statutes. Although we are bound
by decisions of a state supreme court in diversity cases, we need not adhere to a
decision if we think it no longer would be followed.
Id. at 1078 (footnote omitted).
32 Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 113 (Okla. 1962) (quoting
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921)).
3 See, e.g., Lowe v. Morrison, 412 So. 2d 1212, 1213-14 (Ala. 1982); Alaska State Hous.
Auth. v. Walsh & Co., 625 P.2d 831, 836 (Alaska 1980); Carter v. Quick, 563 S.W.2d 461, 463
(Ark. 1978); Wahlberg v. Moudy, 329 P.2d 377, 381 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), vacated, 331
P.2d 234 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Godwin-Bevers Co. v. G.P. Enterprises, Inc., 502 P.2d
1124, 1126 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Vezina v. Nautilus Pools, Inc., 610 A.2d 1312, 1318 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1992); Grossman Holdings Ltd. v. Hourihan, 414 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1982); Ervin
Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 874 P.2d 506, 513-14 (Idaho 1993); Mayfield v. Swafford, 435
N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Clark's Pork Farms v. Sand Livestock Sys., Inc., 563
N.E.2d 1292, 1297 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Brown v. Holland, No. CL 93936, 2005 WL 2861973,
at *5 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Mar. 28, 2005); Andrulis v. Levin Constr. Corp., 628 A.2d 197 (Md.
1993); Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Minn. 1983); Asp v. O'Brien, 277 N.W.2d
382, 384 (Minn. 1979); A&F Properties, LLC v. Lake Caroline, Inc., 775 So. 2d 1276, 1281
(Miss. Ct. App. 2000); Erney v. Freeman, 84 S.W.3d 529, 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Mort
Wallin of Lake Tahoe, Inc. v. Commercial Cabinet Co., 784 P.2d 954, 955 (Nev. 1989); M.W.
Goodell Constr. Co. v. Monadnock Skating Club, 429 A.2d 329, 330 (N.H. 1981); Velop, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 693 A.2d 917, 934-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); City Sch. Dist. v. McLane
Constr. Co., 445 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); YCS Concrete, Inc. v. Hixson, Nos.
2003-T-0185, 2003-T-0186, 2005 WL 1007251, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005); Thomas
v. Schmidt, 648 P.2d 376, 376-77 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); Greene v. Bearden Enter., Inc., 598
S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Jacobini v. Zimmerman, 487 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1972); Rex T. Fuhriman, Inc. v. Jarrell, 445 P.2d 136, 139 (Utah 1968); Stephan J.
Wittman Family Trust v. Renaissance Hous. Corp., No. 183287, 2000 WL 33406773, at *1 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000); W.G. Slugg Seed & Fertilizer, Inc., v. Paulsen Lumber, Inc., 214
N.W.2d 413, 416-17 (Wis. 1974).
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The conventional rule has been variously stated. One version
expressly adopted by some courts is set out in Section 346(1)(a) of
the first Restatement of Contracts, Damages for Breach of a
Construction Contract:
(1) For a breach by one who has contracted to construct a
specified product, the other party can get judgment for
compensatory damages for all unavoidable harm that the
builder had reason to foresee when the contract was made,
less such part of the contract price as has not been paid and is
not still payable, determined as follows:
(a) For defective or unfinished construction he can get
judgment for either
(i) the reasonable cost of construction and
completion in accordance with the contract, if this is
possible and does not involve unreasonable economic
waste; or
(ii) the difference between the value that the
product contracted for would have had and the value
of the performance that has been received by the
[owner], if construction and completion in
accordance with the contract would involve
unreasonable economic waste.3
A comment to this provision of the Restatement indicates that
what the drafters had in mind when they used the term ''economic
waste" was the situation in which, if the structure were built and
completed in accordance with the contract, some of the work done by
the contractor would have to be destroyed.3
In this Article I will try to show that the rule of economic waste
puts the emphasis on the wrong thing, and that, once again, the
important question is what the owner will do with an award of the
cost of completion if she gets it.
34 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1932). See, e.g., Wa/ilberg, 329 P.2d at
379; Welcome v. Arvida Cmty. Sales, Inc., No. 02-01279-CA, 2004 WL 2340249, at *5 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Sep. 13, 2004); Ervin Constr. Co., 874 P.2d at 513-14; Greene, 598 S.W.2d at 652; Rex
T. Fuhriman, Inc., 445 P.2d at 139.
35 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 346 cmt. b ("Sometimes defects in a
completed structure cannot be physically remedied without tearing down and rebuilding, at a
cost that would be imprudent and unreasonable. The law does not require damages to be
measured by a method involving such economic waste.").
70 Vol. 59:1
2008] COST OF PERFORMNCE OR DIFFERENCE IN VALUE 7
A. The Rule Pro and Con
If rectifying the breach of a construction contract will entail
destroying a significant amount of work done by the contractor, it is
worth asking whether the game is worth the candle.
There are two problems with the approach taken in the first
Restatement: (1) there is no agreed-upon criterion for "unreasonable"
economic waste; and (2) like the Peevyhouse rule, the rule of
economic waste ignores a critical factual issue-the intentions of the
injured party in regard to correction of the defects.
A convenient case to illustrate the problems is Vezina v. Nautilus
Pools, Inc.3 In that case the Vezinas contracted with Nautilus to
install a swimming pool with a "bowled" center on their property at a
price something over $7,000.~ The pool installed did not have a
bowled center.3 The Vezinas sought damages in the amount of
$5,694.78, the cost of retrofitting the pool to conform to the
contract.3
Applying the rule of economic waste, the court must first ascertain
the cost of construction and completion according to the contract .4 ' In
Vezina that was approximately $5,700. To determine whether an
award in that amount would involve unreasonable economic waste,
the court must compare the benchmark figure to some other relevant
figure.' In Vezina the court chose the contract price for the pool, a
sum slightly in excess of $7,000. The court held that "the cost of
rectifying the defendant's omission is so great in comparison to the
cost of the purchase of the pool itself' as to constitute unreasonable
economic waste, and remanded the case for a finding as to the
difference in value of the pool with and without a bowled center.4
Assume, as seems to be generally true in these cases, that the
difference in value is much less than the cost of completion. Now the
plaintiffs have a pool inferior to the one they contracted for, which
they can only rectify by spending a lot more of their own money.
The Vezina court did not cite the Restatement definition of
''economic waste,'' which the Restatement defines as the waste
resulting when work done under color of compliance with the
contract has to be undone and done again.4 The court may, however,
36 6 10 A.2d 1312 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
SId at 1314.
38Id at 1315.
'9 Id at 1319.
' RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONRACTS § 346(1)(a)(i).
41 See i. § 346(1)(a)(ii).
42 Vezina, 610 A.2d at 1319.
43 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 346.
1
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have been thinking along those lines. This illustrates the first problem
with the Restatement rule: there is no articulated criterion for
determining when the cost of "tearing down and rebuilding. .. would
be imprudent and unreasonable.""4
In the Vezina case the court chose the contract price as its figure
for comparison with the cost of performance.4 Though this has some
intuitive appeal, on reflection it is hard to see what the contract price
has to do with anything. What has happened is that the contractor has
put himself in a position where he or someone else (presumably
someone else) will have to do almost as much work as the contractor
had to do when he installed the pool in the first place.4 It is hard to
see why that should be the owner's problem. Some courts have held
that if there is a problem of this sort it should be the contractor's
problem, not the owner' S.4 7
Indeed, courts generally put the burden of proving economic waste
on the contractor.4 That may signify mistrust of the economic waste
rule. If this allocation of the burden of proof has any effect, the effect
is bound to be beneficial.
44 Id. § 346 cmt. b.
41 Vezina, 610 A.2d at 1319.
46 Id. (noting that it would have cost "approximately $200 to $300" to install the correct
pool at the time of construction, but "would cost $5694.78" to fix the pooi after the fact-"the
cost of repair was nearly the same as the purchase price of the pool").
47 See, e.g., Heritage Vill. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Golden Heritage Investors, Ltd., 89 P.3d
513, 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). The Colorado Court of Appeals stated:
Defendants concede that the trial court had discretion to apply a measure of
damages other than diminution in value, but argue that doing so in this case was
economically wasteful because the Association's damage estimate of approximately
$6.5 million exceeded defendant's original construction cost. We are unaware of any
authority that imposes this test for economic waste.
Id. But see Velop, Inc. v. Kaplan, 693 A.2d 917 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), in which the
court stated:
"By virtue of the age of the building and its present condition, the cost of
reconstruction is not an appropriate measure of plaintiff's loss. This is so because the
cost of repairs vastly exceeds the contract price and the probable market value of the
property. It would be anomalous to compel defendant to provide plaintiff with what
essentially amounts to a totally refurbished home, which would be a result far
exceeding what is necessary to make plaintiff whole. Rather the diminution in value
caused by defendant's deceit better reflects plaintiff's actual loss and satisfies the
reasonable expectations of the parties."
Id. at 935 (quoting Correa v. Maggiore, 482 A.2d 192, 198 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)).
48 See, e.g., Greg Allen Constr. Co. v. Estelle, 762 N.E.2d 760, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
af'd in part & vacated in part, 798 N.E.2d 171 (Ind. 2003); Clark's Pork Farms v. Sand
Livestock Sys., Inc., 563 N.E.2d 1292, 1297 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); see also Freeman & Co. v.
Bolt, 968 P.2d 247, 256 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998).
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Some courts have attempted to get a clear fix on the concept of
economic waste. In Greg Allen Construction Co. v. Estelle'49 an
Indiana appellate court made a determnined effort:
Economic waste has been found in situations where the
cost of restoring the property would exceed the value of the
property in its restored condition, where usable property is
destroyed, where the cost to repair would result in
unreasonable duplication of effort, and where the contractor's
work would be substantially undone.50
Unfortunately, such efforts have not advanced matters very far.5
In every "economic waste" case, the court must compare the cost of
correcting the defect with something else. But what else? In Andrulis
v. Levin Construction Corp.,52 the court, adopting the Restatement
rule, observed that economic waste turns on a finding of
disproportionality; the cost of repair must be disproportionate in
relation to something. As the reference point, the court chose
diminution in value, and remanded the case for a finding on that
point. 53 Now the court had arrived at the Peevyhouse rule through the
back door.5
49 762 N.E.2d 760 (Ind. App. 2002).
50 Id at 777 (citing Willie's Constr. Co. v. Baker, 596 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992)).
51 The first situation-in which the cost of completion exceeds the value of the property in
its restored condition-would obtain if, for example, the cost of correcting the defects in the
hypothetical case of the mis-configured $200,000 house were $210,000 rather than $20,000.
Such situations are presumably quite rare. The second situation probably occurs fairly often, and
the court may have a point: perhaps the destruction of usable property, such as the pool in the
Vezina case, requires greater justification than the destruction of useless property, such as
electrical work done so badly that it violates a city ordinance. This point is developed more fully
later in this Article. See discussion infra Part I.B. The third criterion, unreasonable duplication
of effort, potentially reaches every case in which work is done defectively rather than left
incomplete, which would surely be wrong, and there is no good way to draw the line. The fourth
criterion-the contractor's work would be substantially undone-appears to be the third
criterion stated a different way.
5628 A.2d 197 (Md. 1993).
SId at 207.
s4 See, for example, Mayfield v. Swafford, 435 N.E.2d 953 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), in which
the court adopted the economic waste rule and said:
[It would cost the defendant $11,381 to furnish the plaintiff with a $7,000 pool. The
disproportion in the cost-benefit ratio involved here demonstrates the "economic
waste" that can be involved and serves to explain the foundation which underlies that
aspect of the rule which bases the damages for faulty or incomplete construction
upon the diminution in value.
Id at 956. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to receive the lesser of the cost of repairs
or the diminution in value of the property. Id. at 957-58.
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All in all, in the typical case, couching the criteria for an award of
the cost of performance in terms of "unreasonable economic waste"
requires the courts to "set sail on a sea of dob" 5 -never desirable in
the law if there is a way to avoid it.
The second problem with the first Restatement's rule of economic
waste is that it does not consider the question of whether the owners,
if they are awarded the cost of performance, will be unjustly enriched.
Whether the result in the Vezina case is the correct result or not
depends on whether the plaintiffs, if they got an award equal to the
cost of retrofitting the pool with a bowled center, would spend it that
way. If not, they would get a pool substantially satisfactory to them,
and an additional $5,700. That would be a windfall to themn-a result
the court's decision avoids. But we don't know. For all that appears,
what the Vezinas wanted was a pooi that people could safely dive
into, and they did not get one. Quite possibly, if they got the $5,700,
they would have spent it to rectify the breach. In that event the court's
decision was wrong. It failed to put the owners in as good a position
as the one they would have been in if the pooi contractor had
performed the contract according to its terms.
If vagueness were the only vice of the rule of economic waste,
perhaps we would tolerate it, as we often do in other areas of the law,
such as negligence. The more serious problem is that the rule fails to
take into account what the owner will do with an award of the cost of
performance if he gets it. In the pool case, as in the case of the poorly
constructed house, if the breach is rectified, work done will have to be
undone. Some of the contractor's expenditures will be wasted in that
sense. It is wrong to focus narrowly on that fact, and overlook the
crucial point that the original work was botched work. The owner
should not be penalized because the contractor invested resources in
building something that the contract did not call for.
The rule of economic waste is ultimately no better than the rule of
the Peevyhouse case. 56 A better rule, this Article contends, would be
55 The expression comes from an opinion dear to the hearts of antitrust scholars, the
opinion of Judge William Howard Taft in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271
(6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The full quote is:
It is true that there are some cases in which the courts, mistaking, as we conceive, the
proper limits of the relaxation of the rules for determining the unreasonableness of
restraints of trade, have set sail on a sea of doubt, and have assumed the power to
say, in respect to contracts which have no other purpose and no other consideration
on either side than the mutual restraint of the parties, how much restraint of
competition is in the public interest, and how much is not.
Id. at 283-84.
56 At least the Peevyhouse rule is tailored to prevent unjust enrichment in some cases. See
discussion supra Part I.A. The rule of economic waste is not.
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that when a contractor breaches a construction contract, the owner is
entitled to recover the cost of construction and completion if, but only
if, he intends to spend that sum on rectifying the breach; otherwise, he
may recover only the difference in value of the property with and
without the promised performance.
Some courts applying the rule of economic waste hint at this. In
Lyon v. Belosky Construction, Inc.,5 the issue was the measure of
damages for defective construction of a home ostensibly built to the
specifications of the owners. As constructed, the roof was seriously
misaligned, and as a result the main entrance was defective in several
respects.5 The court stated the economic waste rule and applied it:
[T]here is evidence that, under the circumstances presented
here, the defect was substantial. Plaintiffs contracted to build
a custom home at significant expense which, in fact,
exceeded the fair market value of the home as completed per
the drawings. Because they were away from the work site
during most of the construction, plaintiffs retained and relied
upon various professionals to assist them in successfully
completing the project. It is clear from the record that the
aesthetic appearance of the home, both inside and out, was of
utmost importance to plaintiffs. Our review of the
photographs of the home as constructed compared with the
design drawings convinces us that plaintiffs did not get the
benefit of their bargain and that requiring defendants to
remedy the problem would not, under these particular
circumstances, result in unreasonable economic waste.
Accordingly, we find that the Supreme Court [of New York]
applied the appropriate measure of damages. 59
In the same vein, Carter v. Quick0o held that in a case involving a
residential dwelling, cost of correction is more fitting than difference
in value. The court explained that the owner is interested "in having
defective construction corrected so that he and his family may enjoy a
properly constructed dwelling and he is not concerned with offsetting
any loss on a possible resale of the property.",6'
~669 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
5Id.dat 401.
59 Id at 401-02 (citing City Sch. Dist. v. McLane Constr. Co., 445 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y.
App. Div. 198 1); Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 192 1)).
563 S.W.2d 461 (Ark. 1978).
6Id at 465. See also Willie's Construction Co. v. Baker, 596 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct. App.
199 2), and text accompanying notes 107-09 infra.
5
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B. Some Additional Cases
In some instances it makes no difference whether the rule applied
is the rule of economic waste or what I argue is the "better rule,"
because they lead to the same result. An instructive case is Ervin
Construction Co. v. Van Orden. 62 A builder brought suit against a
home-owning couple, alleging that they had breached their contract
for construction of a log house by terminating it without giving him a
reasonable opportunity to cure the defects in the initial construction.6
The trial court held for the plaintiff on the issue of the homeowners'
breach, and the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed.64 However, since
the home as built was defective, the homeowners were entitled to
damages for the builder's breach. The supreme court applied the
conventional rule, and held that since the correction of the defects did
not involve unreasonable economic waste, the homeowners were
entitled to the cost of performance.6 Under the better rule, the case
would have come out the same way. By the time of trial the
homeowners had already paid another contractor to correct the defects
66
and were seeking to recover what they had spent, so teewsno
question as to their intent.
Another case in which the court got to the right result without
asking the right question was Mort Wallin of Lake Tahoe, Inc. v.
Commercial Cabinet Co. 67 Defendant contracted to build a men's
store in a casino for the store operator, replacing a store that had been
destroyed by fire. The total cost of construction was $158,058. The
store was to have been paneled with Philippine mahogany veneer, but
apparently there were flaws in the paneling job. The store operator
sought damages in an amount in excess of $340,000, which its experts
testified would be the cost of replacing the paneling.6 The Nevada
Supreme Court refused to award judgment in that amount, holding
that it would be economically wasteful to award the cost of
replacement where the total cost of building the entire building was
far less than that.6
62 874 P.2d 506 (Idaho 1993).
63 Id at 508-09.
"Id at 508, 5 10.
61 Idat 514.
66 Id at 508.
67 784 P.2d 954 (Nev. 1989) (per curiam).
68 These facts appear in the Supreme Court of Nevada's prior decision in this case,
Commercial Cabinet Co. v. Mort Wall in of Lake Tahoe, Inc., 737 P.2d 515, 516-17 (Nev. 1987)
(per curiam).
69 Mart Wallin of Lake Tahoe, Inc., 784 P.2d at 955.
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In this instance, if the court had followed the better rule, it would
have asked whether the plaintiff would have spent a $340,000 damage
award to correct a paneling defect in a $158,000 structure. The
answer has to be probably not. If that is the answer, the plaintiff was
entitled to recover only the difference in value of the store with and
without conforming paneling. Since the plaintiff failed to establish the
difference in value at trial,70 it properly took nothing on this phase of
its complaint.
Sometimes, however, the outcome will differ depending on
whether the rule applied is the rule of economic waste or the better
rule.
In Thomas v. Schmidt7' the plaintiff, a homeowner, appealed from
a judgment in her favor in a suit against a contractor for breach of
contract, contending that the trial court had applied the wrong rule in
assessing her damages. Plaintiff proved at trial that the roofs
defendant installed on her house and garage were discolored, and
correction of the defect would require re-roofing the buildings.
Plaintiff sought damages in the amount of $2,160, the cost of new
roofs.7 Applying the majority rule of economic waste, the appellate
court held that since the defects were merely aesthetic, an award of
the cost of correcting the defects would result in "gross economic
waste."7 However, it appears that the court got it wrong. On these
facts, it seems entirely probable that if the plaintiff got the $2,160 she
would have spent it on new roofs, and that the court's award of $325
failed to put her in as good a position as the one she would have been
in if the contract had been fully performed.
The better rule I argue for in this Article has modest support in the
cases. In Advanced, Inc. v. Wilks,7 homeowners brought suit against
a contractor, contending that the contractor had breached its
contractual duty to build an elliptical earth-sheltered home in a
workmanlike manner. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs
$150,402.75 as the cost of correcting defects in the contractor's
performance.7 On appeal the contractor argued that this award was
excessive when compared to the difference in value of the house with
and without correction of the defects.7 The Supreme Court of Alaska
gave careful consideration to the contention, and concluded that it
70 id
71 648 P.2d 376 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
72 Id at 376-77.
13 Idat 377.
74 711 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1985).
71 Id at 525.
76 Id at 526.
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improperly failed to account for the injured parties' intentions with
regard to expenditure of the larger damage award:
An owner's recovery is not necessarily limited to diminution
in value whenever that figure is less than the cost of repair. It
is true that in a case where the cost of repair exceeds the
damages under the value formula, an award under the cost of
repair measure may place the owner in a better economic
position than if the contract had been fully performed, since
he could pocket the award and then sell the defective
structure. On the other hand, it is possible that the owner will
use the damage award for its intended purpose and turn the
structure into the one originally envisioned.... If he does this
his economic position will equal the one he would have been
in had the contractor fully performed. The fact finder is the
one in the best position to determine whether the owner will
actually complete performance, or whether he is only
interested in obtaining the best immediate economic position
he can.~
Sometimes the failure to inquire into the intentions of the injured
party gives that party a substantial windfall. An extreme case is
Corbello v. Iowa Production.8 The plaintiffs granted Shell Oil
Company an oil and gas lease on 120 acres of land.7 In the lease,
Shell Oil agreed "'.that upon termination of th~e] lease it w~ould]
reasonably restore the premises as nearly as possible to their
pre[vious] condition."' 80 In the landowners' suit, the jury awarded the
plaintiffs $33 million as the cost of doing the restoration which the
tenants failed to do.8 On appeal, the tenants contended that $33
million was an excessive award in light of the fact that the value of
the leased property was only $108,'000.82 The Supreme Court of
Louisiana affirmed the jury's award, holding that in contract cases of
this kind the party in breach was liable for the full cost of
performance of its contractual commitment to restore the land, market
value notwithstanding. 83 In all probability this barely credible result
would have been avoided if the jury had been instructed to determine
77 Id at 527 (footnotes omitted).
78 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).
79 Id. at 691.
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whether the plaintiffs, if they were awarded the $33 million, would
spend it to restore land worth $108,000 to its original condition.
Some courts have resolved this issue by reference to the aesthetic
importance of the breach. On the face of the matter it is unclear why
aesthetic importance should make any difference. It may be, however,
that aesthetic importance is the key to the injured party's intent. In
City School District v. McLane Construction Co. ,84 the defendant
contracted to build a swimming pooi for the plaintiff which included a
roof supported by wooden beams. As the appellate court noted, these
were no ordinary beams:
The appearance of the beams was central to the aesthetics of
the architectural scheme as they were to contrast their natural
beauty with the relatively stark unfinished concrete that
comprised the balance of the structure. Even the effectiveness
of the indirect lighting system . . . depended on the beams.
As the building was to be a showplace, the site of large
regional swimming competitions, the design was intentionally
dramatic. 85
The beams as installed were stained, discolored, and permeated
with dirt-a far cry from what the contract called for. The jury
rendered a verdict in an amount equal to the total cost of replacing the
nonconforming beams.8 On appeal the supplier of the beams
contended that the proper measure of damages was the diminution in
value of the structure.8 The court of appeals rejected that contention,
noting that "[o]ne of the school district's principal objectives was to
have an aesthetically prepossessing structure, and that goal has by all
accounts been frustrated.",88 The court did not say why the fact that
aesthetics were involved should matter. It seems reasonable to suspect
that what the court had in mind was that if the plaintiff were awarded
the cost of getting the aesthetically pleasing beams called for by the
contract, it would spend the money to do just that.8





89 In Asp v. O'Brien, 277 N.W.2d 382 (Minn. 1979), the court, applying the economic
waste rule, stood the City School District argument on its head:
In the present case the cost of reconstructing the cabinets would greatly exceed
the original cost of building them. The cabinets were functional as built. The defects
were essentially cosmetic rather than structural. Thus, the trial court did not err in
using diminution in value as the measure of damages.
9
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As a final case that tests the limits of what I call the better rule,
consider the famous case of Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent.90 A builder
contracted to build a country home for a Wall Street lawyer. While
the contract provided that only Reading pipe would be used in the
structure, the builder installed various kinds of pipe in the house, all
apparently very good.9' The principal issue before the New York
Court of Appeals, couched in today's terms, was whether the builder
had substantially performed its duties under the contract. In an
opinion by Judge Cardozo, the court ruled that it had.9 One factor in
the court's decision was that in order for the contractor to replace the
non-conforming pipe with Reading pipe, a great deal of perfectly
good work done in accordance with the contract would have to be
ripped out. 93
The court held that the contractor was entitled to its final payment,
but the homeowner was entitled to offset this payment against the
amount of his damages from the breach. 94 The court stated that in a
case of this kind, where the cost of completion was "grossly and
unfairly out of proportion to the good to be attained,"95 the
appropriate measure of damages was not the cost of completion, but
the diminution in value of the property-which, Judge Cardozo noted,
would be "nominal or nothing," since in market terms Reading pipe
was no better than the pipe the builder installed.9
In this way, the court applied an early version of the rule of
economic waste. Its decision rested in substantial part on the expense
involved in tearing out the walls of a completed structure to cure the
defects in the contractor's performance. 9 7
Under what I have been calling the better rule, the court was
remiss in not inquiring as to what Kent would have done with an
award equal to the cost of completion had he received it. In fact it is
reasonable to suppose that he would not have spent it to tear out the
contractor's work and re-plumb the house. Between the lines in the
opinion there is the suspicion that the owner was using the pipe issue
as a pretext to rook the contractor out of the final payment to which
he was entitled. But, under the better rule, Kent would have had a
Id at 3 84. In view of my stance in this Article, the court was mistaken.
90 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 192 1).
9' Id at 890.
9' Id at 890-91.
9' Id at 89 1.
94 Id at 891-92.
95 Id.
96 id
9' Id. at 89 1.
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shot at the larger award if he could convince the trier of fact that the
difference between Reading pipe and the other pipe was crucial to
him.
Perhaps this is carrying a basically sound idea too far. In the
typical case of what the first Restatement calls "economic waste," the
work that has to be replaced is botched work, i.e., work not done in
accordance with the contract. The Jacob & Youngs, Inc. case is
distinctive in that replacing the pipe would have required the
destruction of a great deal of competent work that was done entirely
in compliance with the contract. Perhaps, in this very limited class of
cases, the rule of economic waste should apply.
1I1. THE RULE OF Loss iN VALUE
In the second Restatement of Contracts, the drafters, expressing
dissatisfaction with the rule of economic waste, crafted a new rule.
Section 348(2) of the second Restatement provides:
(2) If a breach results in defective or unfinished
construction and the loss in value to the injured party is not
proved with sufficient certainty, he may recover damages
based on
(a) the diminution in the market price of the property
caused by the breach, or
(b) the reasonable cost of completing performance or
of remedying the defects if that cost is not clearly
disproportionate to the probable loss in value to him. 98
In Comment c to this rule, the drafters observed:
Sometimes .. , such a large part of the cost to remedy the
defects consists of the cost to undo what has been improperly
done that the cost to remedy the defects will be clearly
disproportionate to the probable loss in value to the injured
party. Damages based on the cost to remedy the defects
would then give the injured party a recovery greatly in excess
of the loss in value to him and result in a substantial windfall.
Such an award will not be made. It is sometimes said that the
award would involve "economic waste," but this is a
misleading expression since an injured party will not, even if
awarded an excessive amount of damages, usually pay to
98 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2) (1979).
1
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have the defects remedied if to do so will cost him more than
the resulting increase in value to him.99
Though a number of courts have adopted the rule of the second
Restatement, 00 in most jurisdictions the law on the books is still the
first Restatement's rule of economic waste. Presumably this is true
because the seminal decisions were rendered before the second
Restatement was published. There seem to be only two cases in which
a court has compared the two rules and opted for the second one.' 0'
This rule resembles the Peevyhouse rule in that it emphasizes
disproportionality. However, this rule also appears to be different.
Whereas the reference point in the Peevyhouse rule is diminution in
value, the reference point in this rule is the "loss in value" to the
injured party. For the sake of convenience, this Article will refer to
this rule as the "rule of loss in value."
Loss in value, the concept central to the rule, is somewhat baffling
in this context. It seems to mean the difference between the value of
the promised work and the value of the work done. How to compute
those values? One way would be to assign, as the value of the
promised work, the value of the premises if the work had been
properly done, and to assign as the value of the work actually done
the value of the premises with the defective work. If this is what the
drafters meant, they revived the rule of the Peevyhouse case. But it is
by no means certain that that is what they meant. It does not help
matters that the rule provides that cost of performance is available as
a remedy only when "[actual] loss in value" cannot be proven with
reasonable certainty and the cost of performance is not
disproportionate to the "~probable loss in value."' 0 2
Understandably, the courts have had difficulty with "loss in
value." Some simply gloss over it. 103 Some confuse loss in value with
economic waste. 104 Some appear to treat loss in value as equivalent to
99 Id § 348 cmt. c.
10aSee, e.g., C.J. Betters Corp. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 674, 677 (Cl. Ct. 1992);
Williams v. Charles Sloan, Inc., 706 S.W.2d 405, 406 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986); Centimark Corp. v.
Vill. Manor Assocs., No. CV030070 166, 2007 WL 2081276, at *26 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 21,
2007); Council of Unit Owners of Sea Colony E. v. Carl M. Freeman Assocs., Inc., 564 A.2d
357, 360 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Gilbert v. Tony Russell Constr., 772 P.2d 242, 246 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1989); Flom v. Stahly, 569 N.W.2d 135, 142 (Iowa 1997); Kenney v. Medlin Const. &
Realty Co., 315 S.E.2d 311, 315 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); St. Louis, LLC v. Final Touch Glass &
Mirror, Inc., 899 A.2d 1018, 1025 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); Douglass v. Licciardi
Constr. Co., 562 A.2d 913, 915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Eastlake Constr. Co. v. Hess, 686 P.2d
465, 473 (Wash. 1984).
'O See Gilbert, 772 P.2d at 246-47; Eastlake Constr. Co., 686 P.2d at 474.
'
02 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2) (emphasis added).
10 See, e.g., Flom, 569 N.W.2d 135.
104See, e.g., Crest Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 115 P.3 d 349 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
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diminution in value, converting the rule of loss in value to the rule of
the Peevyho use case. 105
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, courts manage to get to a result
under § 348, and the result in almost all of the cases available is that
the injured party recovers the cost of correcting the defects if she
wants it. 106 Under the better rule, the injured party is entitled to the
cost of correction if, but only if, it is more probable than not that she
will spend it to correct the defects, and not for something else. This
means that under the rule of loss in value, the contractor is very
seldom unjustly enriched, though the injured party may be. Arguably,
if one party is to get a windfall, it ought to be the injured party rather
than the contractor at fault.
Some courts in the loss in value cases espouse views that are
similar to mine in this Article. This is particularly likely to happen in
cases involving the construction of homes custom-built to the owners'
specifications. In Willie's Construction Co. v. Baker,107 the court
reasoned that "the difference in market value ... 'is rather
discriminate against a plaintiff ":
"What if a plaintiff does not want to sell his property? In this
posture the effect of the rule would be where the restoration
costs exceed the "before and after" measure, a plaintiff would
receive that latter. Consequently, if he did not desire to sell
the building, he would not receive damages sufficient to
restore the building to its original condition. The "before and
after" test, if used in cases of non-permanent injury, is in
reality forcing the plaintiff to sell the building in order to
restore himself to the same position enjoyed before the injury.
Certainly such a measure of damages partially compensates a
plaintiff for injury done to his building and affords some
protection to a part of his property rights. However, it would
seem more proper to place the plaintiff in a position where he
could be unrestricted in the exercise of his property rights of
continued ownership or alienation. When these considerations
are weighed against the possible "windfall" that might be
05 See. e.g., Gilbert, 772 P.2d at 247; Kenney, 315 S.E.2d at 314; Freeman v. Maple Point,
Inc., 574 A.2d 684, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Douglass, 562 A.2d at 915.
10 ee.g., St. Louis, LLC v. Final Touch Glass & Mirror, Inc., 899 A.2d 10 18, 1025-28
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (upholding jury verdict approxinating cost of repair for injured
party who had already sold the house with defective construction).
107 596 N.E.2d 958 (Id. Ct. App. 1992).
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given to a plaintiff, the former takes precedence over the
latter."' 0 8
The court also said:
The fair market value of a home does not necessarily
reflect the value to the homeowner. As many homeowners
discover, it is not unusual to find that the cost of additions or
improvements made in order to conform a home to the
owner's personal tastes, often do not result in a corresponding
increase in the home's market value. The provision in the
contract [in suit] requiring one hundred inch basement walls
was an unusual one for which there was an extra $414.00
charge. Walls taller than eighty-eight inches are extremely
rare according to Willie's experts. This was a feature that the
Bakers wanted from the beginning and Willie's specifically
agreed to provide it. It is difficult to put a valuation on the
difference in height because the Bakers wanted this
modification as a matter of personal taste, not because it
would increase the value of their home.'109
A common thread in these cases is that the courts assume-in this
instance because a residence is involved and there appears to be
nothing to indicate that the owner wants to sell it-that if the owner
recovers the cost of completing the work according to the contract,
that is the way she will spend the money. That, I submit, is exactly the
sort of reasoning we should hope to find in the cases.
All in all, given the slant in the cases toward giving the injured
party the cost of correction or completion, the rule of loss in value is
preferable to the rule of economic waste and the Peevyhouse rule. By
and large, apart from the two cases just cited, the courts tend to ignore
what I have argued should be the decisive factor in cases of this kind,
i.e., whether or not the injured party, if she gets the larger award, will
actually spend it to correct the adverse consequences of the breach. In
other words, in the typical case arising under § 348 of the second
Restatement, the courts get to what in many instances appears to be
the right result by the wrong path.
18Id. at 961-62 (quoting Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co. v. La Salle Realty Corp., 218 N.E.2d
141, 151 (Ind. App. 1966)).
101.at 961. In the same vein, see Lyon v. Belosky, 669 N.Y.5.2d 400 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998), Carter v. Quick, 563 S.W.2d 461 (Ark. 1978), and supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
84 Vol. 59:1
2008] COST OF PERFORMANCE OR DIFFERENCE IN VAL UE 8
IV. CONCLUSION
In cases involving construction contracts where the contractor fails
to perform his part in full, the Peevyhouse rule, the now conventional
rule of economic waste, and the newer rule of loss in value are all
defective in the same respect. Because they leave out of account the
question of whether the injured party will probably spend an award of
the cost of performance on obtaining that performance, they have the
tendency to deny to that party his full expectancy.
What I have been calling the better rule in this Article would
perit the injured party to recover the cost of substitute performance
in full, if she proves that more probably than not she will spend that
sum on remedial work.
No rule does away completely with the possibility that on the facts
of a particular case, one party or the other will get a windfall. The
better rule is best calculated to minimize those instances, and to
ensure that if such a thing does occur, no benefit accrues to the party
in the wrong-i.e., the contractor who did a lousy job and walked
away from it.
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